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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee 
vs. 
HERBERT LANDRY, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20070075-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Landry intentionally and 
unlawfully damaged a habitable structure by means of fire or explosives? The standard 
of review for this issue is as follows: "[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which might be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App.1991) (quoting 
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State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). This issue was preserved in an oral 
motion for a directed verdict (R. 119: 54-55). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-103 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the offense is in 
the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Herbert Landry appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for directed 
verdict and from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth District Court 
after he was convicted by a jury of aggravated arson, a first degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Herbert Landry was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court with 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-103 
(R. 1). A preliminary hearing was held on April 13, 2006 and Landry was bound over for 
trial upon a finding of probable cause (R. 30,116: 36). On April 20, 2006 Landry was 
arraigned and pled not guilty (R. 35). 
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On August 14 and 16, 2006 a jury trial was held with Judge Steven L. Hansen 
presiding (R. 45-43, 118, 119). The jury found Landry guilty of the charge (R. 51). 
The jury panel was given a questionnaire as part of jury selection. One of the 
questions on the questionnaire was: "What are your feelings or opinions about people 
who have been charged with a crime?" (Question #4, Jury Questionnaire). During 
selection each party was allowed the opportunity to question the panel, and one question 
asked by Landry was how many of the panel "consider him an innocent man as he sits 
here today? And... how many of you don't have an opinion about whether or not he is 
innocent right now?" (R. 118: 29-30). One unnamed member of the panel indicated, "he 
is innocent at least until I hear proof that he is not innocent" (R. 118: 30). Afterwards, 
the trial court and parties questioned members of the panel individually about their 
responses on the questionnaire (R. 118: 31-). During the questioning process the court 
indicated that he didn't like the way question #4 was stated on the questionnaire because 
it is a "trick question" and "confusing" (R. 118: 44-45). The court instructed counsel to 
not use that wording in the questioning process, however, the court would not tell counsel 
how to ask the question, only that it would have to be asked differently (R. 118: 45-46). 
During trial, Landry moved the court for a directed verdict due to insufficient 
evidence (R. 119: 54-55). The trial court denied the motion (R. 119: 55). 
During deliberations the jury sent two notes to the court indicating that they were 
deadlocked (R. 50). It appears the court answered the first note with the following 
response: "At this point, you should continue to deliberate to attempt to reach a verdict." 
After five hours of deliberation, and perhaps after a second note was received which 
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indicated that the jury was "still at an impasse" with no indication of anyone willing to 
change their position, Judge Hansen had the jury brought into the courtroom (R. 50; 119: 
56). The court informed the jury that although they had deliberated "a long time/' he was 
going to ask them to come back the following morning to continue deliberating and try 
again to reach a unanimous verdict (R. 119: 56). The jurors did not want to come back 
the following morning and told the court they would rather continue to deliberate than 
have to return the next day (R. 119: 57-58). After further deliberations, the jury finally 
came back with a unanimous verdict of guilty (R. 119: 59). The record is silent as to how 
much time lapsed between the final conversation with the court and the jury reaching a 
verdict. 
On October 31, 2006 Landry was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison and ordered to pay $350,000 in restitution (R, 60-59, 120: 6-7). 
On November 29, 2006 the court received a letter from Landry advising the court 
that he wished to appeal his conviction (R, 83-81). On December 6, 2006 counsel for 
Landry filed a motion to reinstate time to appeal (R. 92-88). On December 21, 2006 the 
court granted the motion and extended the time to appeal 30 days (R. 93), On January 
17, 2007 a formal and timely notice of appeal was filed in Fourth District Court (R. 115). 
This matter was subsequently transferred from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A, Testimony of Matthew Mendel 
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On February 26, 2006 Matthew Mendel was living with his wife, Brittany, at 
Shadow Way Apartments, 455 North 400 West, Apartment 1 in Provo (R. 118: 83-84), It 
was a three-story structure (R. 118: 84). On that day there was a fire at the complex (R. 
118: 84). He and Brittany had finished dinner at around 4:30 p.m. and were watching 
television when they heard from neighbors that there was a "fire out one of the back 
windows of the apartment" (R. 118: 85, 87). They attempted to look at the apartment but 
decided it wasn't safe (R. 118: 92). They left and saw black smoke coming out of 
apartment 11, which was Herbert Landry's apartment (R. 118: 85). Brittany called 911 
(R. 118:88), 
Mendel testified that he had earlier seen Landry athrough the apartment window as 
he walked by "and about ten minutes later he exited once again. And then five minutes 
after that occurrence of him leaving we saw the fire, or noticed smoke" in his apartment 
(R. 118: 86, 90). Landry was with a Caucasian male (R. 118: 86). 
Mendel told police that the fire started at approximately 5 p.m.; and that Landry 
had hurriedly walked by five minutes before the fire (R. 118: 89-90, 93-94). 
B* Testimony of Brittany Mendel 
Brittany Mendel testified that she knows Landry (R. 118: 96). She and her 
husband Matthew were watching television in their apartment and through the window 
she saw Landry walk by (R. 118: 96). She knew he was being evicted (R. 118: 96). She 
stated, "[A] little while later I noticed him walk out of his apartment and leave. And I 
remember noticing that, and not five to ten minutes later is when we were alerted about 
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the fire'" (R. 118: 96). Landry was with another person (R. 118: 97). She did not see 
Landry after the fire (R. 118: 100). 
There is another stairwell on the building so individuals coming and going from 
Landry's apartment would not necessarily walk by their window (R. 118: 98). Brittany 
testified that she believes there was a window broken out next to Landry's door that had 
been replaced with cardboard (R. 118: 99). 
Brittany checked her call log on her phone later that night and she had called 911 
at around 4:30 p.m. (R. 118: 98). At the police station she gave her best guess as to time 
and didn't check her phone until afterwards (R. 118: 98). 
C. Testimony of Rex Nelson 
Rex Nelson is a fire investigator with Unified Fire in Salt Lake City, who also 
handles an accelerant detection canine named Oscar (R. 118: 101). Oscar generally finds 
"ignitable liquids, the typical type of liquid that you'd find in a hardware store, for 
instance kerosene, Coleman fuel, lighter fluid, charcoal lighter gasoline is the most 
common type of accelerants that he's trained on, kerosene (R. 118: 102). There are 
times, however—approximately 10 percent of the time—when Oscar has alerted on a 
substance and it "comes back not identifiable hydrocarbon" (R. 118: 102-03, 111). 
Alcohol is not a substance Oscar is trained on (R. 118: 107). 
Nelson with Oscar investigated the fire at the apartment complex and with 
Landry's consent went into and searched his apartment (R. 118: 103-04). There was soot 
in the front room but no fire damage (R. 118: 104), The fire damage started around the 
kitchen area: "it had come out of the bedroom in the southeast corner of this apartment. 
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So I started the search there. We worked the kitchen area into the bathroom and then the 
southeast bedroom" (R. 118: 104). Two feet inside the southeast bedroom Oscar alerted 
against the base wall (R. 118: 104-05). They continued down the north wall and Oscar 
made a second alert (R.l 18:105). A third alert was made on the southeast comer (R. 
118: 105). Nelson found a lot of fire debris in the room so Oscar was taken out while it 
was removed or excavated from the middle of the room (R. 118: 105). The closet had 
extensive damage and there were some irregular bum patterns in the middle of the room 
(R. 118: 108). 
After the search, Nelson took Oscar to a unit at the National 9 Motel at the request 
of Jim Guynn where Landry was present (R. 118: 105-06). Nelson had Landry remove 
his socks and shoes and set them out in the room (R. 118: 106). Oscar was brought in 
and purportedly alerted on one sock and one shoe (R. 118: 106). However, there was no 
crime lab report indicating that any ignitable substance was found on either the sock or 
the shoe. 
After the items are identified as a possible source of ignitable liquid they are 
turned over to investigators and the crime lab (R. 118: 108). 
D. Testimony of Jeff Sucher 
Jeff Sucher was the manager of the apartment building, which contained 44 units 
(R. 118: 112). Approximately 39 of the units were occupied on the date of the fire, 
including one unit occupied by Landry (R. 118: 113). Landry was a victim of hurricane 
Katrina and FEMA had been paying his rent (R. 118: 116). The unit's kitchen window 
was broken and cardboard had been put in until the new window was ready (R. 118: 116). 
7 
The front door had also been damaged by Landry and another individual in a fight and 
had been replaced approximately two months or so before the fire (R. 118: 117-18). 
The fire began in unit 11 which was Landry's unit (R. 118: 113-14). He was in 
the process of being evicted (R. 118: 114). Sucher and Landry had a verbal deal that he 
would be out of the apartment by 9:00 p.m. and that "we would no longer pursue any past 
due rents or damages in exchange for his leaving" (R. 118: 114,119-20). 
They were scheduled to do a final walk-through at 9 p.m. but that did not occur 
(R. 118: 114). Sucher had left the premises about 1 p.m. and returned with the phone call 
that the building was on fire (R. 118: 115). Sucher did not see Landry later that evening 
as he did not show up for the walk-through (R. 118: 115). 
It was estimated by insurance officials that $183,000 damage was done to the 
apartment unit (R. 118: 115). 
E. Testimony of Drew Hubbard 
Drew Hubbard is a Provo City Police officer (R. 118: 121). On February 26, 2006 
he interviewed Landry several hours after the fire (R. 118: 122). Landry indicated to him 
that before the fire he was at the apartment where he had sex with his girlfriend, grabbed 
a bottle of alcohol and had a conversation, and then left a short time later (R. 118: 122). 
Hubbard testified that Landry showed no concern for his belongings and did not ask 
about them (R. 118: 122-23). 
Hubbard arrived at the scene of the fire at approximately 6 p.m. (R. 118: 123). He 
was there to see if it was a crime scene (R. 118: 124). At the scene he encountered a 
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woman who had to be restrained because she wanted to retrieve a cat, and he remembered 
somebody mentioning a woman was suicidal (R. 118: 124). 
Hubbard also interviewed a woman that may have been with Landry just prior to 
the fire (R. 118: 126). 
F. Testimony of Russ Sneddon 
Russ Sneddon is the Orem City fire marshal (R. 118: 132-33). He was called to 
assist with the apartment fire (R. 118: 133). When he arrived it was an "active fire scene 
that was winding down. There was still some activity going on, there was a lot of fire 
apparatus and personnel around'* (R. 118: 133). A majority of the fire was out but a few 
hotspots in the ceiling area were still being worked on (R. 118: 133). 
Part of his duty as fire marshal is to investigate fires, including origin and cause 
analysis (R. 118: 134). He walked around the perimeter of the building looking for 
smoke and heat patterns (R. 118:135). Next an interior survey for damage was 
conducted of each apartment (R. 118: 135). 
The area of origin was found to be "an apartment in the middle of the complex 
towards the center of the building on the second floor" (R. 118: 135). Permission was 
received to enter the apartment and a search was conducted (R. 118: 135-36). There was 
heavy smoke damage in the living room area along with some water damage (R. 118: 
136). The kitchen also had heavy smoke damage along with "baking down within 
proximity of the floor" (R. 118: 136). More heat damage and blistering were found along 
the walls and cabinets as "we moved towards the south portion of the apartment5' (Id.). 
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Fire damage was then located in the bathroom and hallway towards the bedroom where 
the door had been "completely bumed ofT (R. 118: 137). 
The bedroom was the area of origin where the fire occurred (R. 118: 137). The 
bed springs were exposed, windows in the south wall were broken out, and the floor was 
heavily damaged (R. 118: 138). In addition, the carpet was heavily damaged or 
completely bumed away and there were few other contents in the room other than the bed 
save a portion of a stool, burnt umbrella and a pile of clothing (R. 118: 138-39, 149). 
Some materials used in carpeting and flooring are flammable (R. 118: 145-46). 
However, Sneddon testified that such trace material "would not be there in a sufficient 
amount to cause the type or amount of damage" that was observed in this case (R. 118: 
147). 
The conclusion was that the fire had originated at the floor level of the bedroom, 
south of the north wall and west of the bed (R. 118: 140). Nothing signifying an 
accidental cause—such as an unattended candle, discarded lighter material, or 
malfunctioning electrical equipment, was found (R. 118: 140-43). The burn patterns on 
the floor "were indicative of a poured or flowing liquid that had been on the floor and 
ignited causing increased damage in the specific areas on the floor consistent with 
ignitable poured liquid" (R. 118: 142). It's possible that a spill could have occurred and 
the container removed (R. 118: 148). It's possible to start a fire with a discarded cigarette 
(R. 118: 149). A cigarette-type lighter was found on the ground in the area outside of the 
apartment (R. 118: 151). Sneddon believes the lighter was taken into evidence (R. 118: 
151). 
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Several items were sent to the crime lab and tested positive for heptane, which is a 
substance that is present in a variety of ignitable liquids primarily petroleum based (R. 
118: 153). The State stipulated that heptane is also in inert glues and things used in the 
construction process (R. 118; 153). 
Sneddon's opinion is that the fire was intentionally set by the ignition of ignitable 
poured liquid on the floor of the bedroom (R. 118: 143). 
Later th&t evening Sneddon went to the motel room where Landry was staying (R. 
118: 150). He did not find anything suspicious in the room (R. 118: 150). 
G. Testimony of Jim Guynn 
Jim Guynn is the Provo City fire marshal (R. 118: 159). Guynn did his own walk-
through of the premises but wasn't with Sneddon and the others when evidence was 
collected (R. 118: 161). However, he collected other evidence (R. 118: 161). 
He also questioned Landry about possible causes of the fire, including asking him 
about cigarettes and smoking materials, problems with electrical components, and 
chemicals which could decompose and self heat (R. 118: 162; 119: 27). All these 
questions Landry "answered in the negative" (R. 118: 162; 119: 27). Landry upon 
questioning also informed Guynn that there was no smoldering fire in the apartment 
when he left, and no odors of smoke or "anything that could have been possible that a 
smoldering fire was already burning when he left the apartment" (R. 118: 162-63). 
Accordingly, based upon physical examination and interviewing Landry, accidental 
causes were eliminated (R. 118: 163). Guynn testified on rebuttal that Landry did not 
inform him that alcohol had been spilled during a party the previous night, or about his 
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girlfriend smoking before they left the apartment immediately before the fire (R. 119: 
28). 
Guynn was aware that Landry showed up at the fire (R. 118: 174). However, he 
couldn't recall Landry informing him that his girlfriend had been smoking in the 
apartment (R. 118: 174). He acknowledged that Landry told him that he didn't start the 
fire (R. 118: 175). 
Guynn testified that at his direction a firefighter cut out a piece of subfloor from 
the bedroom floor of Landry's apartment two days after the fire (R. 118: 163-64, 177-78). 
Guynn testified that it was a piece of "subfloor that was located below the surface of the 
floor in the room of origin" (R. 118: 165). There were a number of fire generated 
patterns burned through the carpet and the particle board (R. 118: 165). The fire, Guynn 
testified, actually penetrated down into a machined/butt joint; and ordinary combustibles 
like paper or wood don't have the physical characteristics to bum and drop down in there 
"so something has actually transmitted the fire down in there" (R. 118: 167). Molten 
plastics were eliminated and Guynn indicated, "The only thing we had left was an 
ignitable liquid that was poured or otherwise distributed" (R. 118: 167). Guynn does not 
know what condition the board was in prior to the fire (R. 118: 182). Nor does Guynn 
know how the ignitable liquid got on the floor—i.e. whether it was poured or spilled (R. 
118: 188). But when the liquid hits the floor it runs to the lowest places in the floor and 
usually cools (R. 118: 188). 
Guynn testified that based on the totality of factors present at the scene and 
knowledge gained through investigation and interviews, it's his opinion that "by 
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eliminating all of the other causes... this [was] an intentionally set fire, an incendiary 
fire" (R. 118:173), 
Guynn was aware of the unidentified man and a vehicle seen by David Turpin, but 
any other information about the man was not discovered (R.119: 30-31). 
H* Testimony of David Turpin 
David Turpin lived in unit #10 at the time of the fire and was a neighbor of "Herb" 
(R. 119: 5). At approximately three or four o'clock on the afternoon of the fire, Turpin 
left his apartment (R. 119: 6). On the way out he noticed that a window in Landry's 
apartment that was "covered by cardboard" had been pushed in (R. 119: 6). Before he 
left he had heard a knock that he thought was at his door, but when he opened his door he 
found a tall, thin black man with glasses, a goatee, and shaggy beard standing next door 
(R. 119: 6-7, 8). He was wearing dark clothes, a dark hat and glasses (R. 119: 7). He had 
seen the man before at Landry's (R. 119: 7). 
Turpin had seen Landry earlier in the morning that day (R. 119: 8). Turpin wasn't 
present when the fire started (R. 119: 9). 
I. Testimony of Herbert Landry 
Herbert Landry is from New Orleans, Louisiana (R. 119: 11). During hurricane 
Katrina he was separated from his wife and family (R. 119: 12). He was flown to Utah 
and spent two months at Camp Williams until he was given an apartment in Provo that 
was paid for by FEMA (R. 119: 12), He also received $400 a month in disaster pay (R. 
119: 13). In the apartment he had two television sets, clothes, medicine, a DVD player, a 
VCR and his bed (R. 119: 13). He lost everything in the fire (R. 119: 13), 
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The day before the fire Landry had friends over to the apartment (R. 119: 14). 
They drank cognac and watched videos because Landry was planning on leaving for 
Colleen, Texas the next day because he was being "evicted from the government because 
we ask the manager, had a conflict. It wasn't nothing that was—I mean, I was going to 
leave that day because, like I said, we had a conflict. And it wasn't nothing bad. I mean, 
he was a good man" (R. 119: 14). During the party some of the drinks spilled on the 
floor: one spilled on the T.V., one on the wall by the bed, and there were three or four 
drinks spilled on the bedroom floor (R. 119: 14-15). Landry believes that the alcohol 
spilled on the floor was in about the location that testimony indicated the fire had 
originated (R. 119: 15). His wife and children live in Texas and he was going to them (R. 
119:17). 
On the day of the fire he and "Josephine" went into the apartment and watched 
television and talked (R. 119: 16). She also had a pack of cigarettes she was smoking 
while sitting at the end of the bed (R. 119: 16). Sometime in the early evening before 
dark, they left the apartment (R. 119: 16). When they left, the front door was unlocked 
and the cardboard was still in the window (R. 119: 21). They visited a friend at a motel 
(R. 119: 18). Landry saw the fire on television and immediately went back to the 
apartment because his medication was there (R. 119: 19). His name was said wrong on 
the news: Robert Landry instead of Herbert (R. 119: 19). 
When he arrived back at the apartment complex police asked him his name and he 
was taken to the police station where he was questioned (R. 119: 19). He told officers 
he'd seen the fire on television and had come immediately to the scene to find out what 
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happened (R. 119: 20). Landry testified that he "lost everything like my clothes, T.V. I 
don't even have a pair of socks. I mean everything was lost, my medicine. I even had 
money in the house, and I had my mailbox key" (R. 119: 20). Landry left his clothes in a 
suitcase on the floor and had intended to return to the apartment for the 9 p.m. walk 
through with the manager (R. 119: 24). 
Landry denied setting the fire both when he was interviewed by the police and 
when he testified at trial (R. 119: 20). 
Landry does not know Josephine* s last name, or the last names of the people at his 
apartment the night before the fire (R. 119: 22). He testified that he didn't tell Guynn 
about the alcohol from the night before or Josephine smoking because he wasn't asked 
about it (R. 119: 22-23). Landry testified that police spoke with Josephine because "she 
was with me at the police station" (R. 119: 26). 
Landry was wearing the same clothes—a T-shirt, corduroy pants, white socks and 
slippers—he had on the night before because "I was going to move that day so I had the 
same clothes on because it was a hot day and I wanted to change clothes after I do all of 
that, and I didn't have no other clothes" (R. 119: 15). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Landry asserts that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he intentionally and unlawfully damaged a habitable structure by 
means of fire or explosives; and that his conviction, therefore, must be reversed because 
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime 
of aggravated arson as codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-103. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Evidence was Insufficient to Establish Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
that Landry Committed the Crime of Aggravated Arson 
Like all persons charged with a crime, Landry enjoyed the presumption of 
innocence as a matter of law. This constitutional presumption cannot be overcome unless 
and until the prosecution proves every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This presumption of innocence is not a 
meaningless platitude but has "concrete substance" {Id. at 363-64). "It is critical that the 
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in 
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned." Id. at 364. The State's evidence in 
this case was circumstantial in nature and insufficient to overcome the presumption of 
Landry's innocence. 
In order to prevail in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Landry must 
"marshal all evidence supporting the jury's verdict and... show how this marshaled 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). 
Circumstantial evidence "alone" may be sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated 
arson "if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt." State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah 1986). "However, 
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'where the only evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial [as in this 
case], the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence. This is because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.'" State v. Layman, 953 
P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). 
The elements of aggravated arson that the State was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt include (1) that Landry; (2) by means of fire or explosives; (3) 
intentionally and unlawfully; (4) damaged a habitable structure (R. 108). The 
circumstantial evidence in this case did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt either 
that Landry committed the crime or that he had the requisite intent. Accordingly, after 
presentation of the evidence, Landry moved for a directed verdict on the ground of 
insufficient evidence (R. 119: 54-55). The trial court denied Landry's motion (R. 119: 
55). 
In addition to the requirement that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime, intent is also an essential element of 
aggravated arson that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Scheel, 832 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). In this case the State's circumstantial 
evidence was insufficient to prove either identity or intent. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-103 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated 
arson only if he acted "intentionally and unlawfully." State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 641 
(Utah 1983). A person's conduct is intentional "when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the 
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term "unlawfully" means "without justification, license or privilege." JW. (citation 
omitted). In Durant, the defendant, "who was in possession of the house, and his friend 
apparently fired some shots in the kitchen very late one night. The friend then left, and 
the defendant apparently used a fire accelerant to set the house on fire. There is no 
suggestion that the fire was accidental or that there was any justifiable or beneficial 
purpose for the fire." 674 P.2d at 642. Therefore in Durant there was no reasonable 
hypothesis that the fire was caused accidentally. 
In Scheel, the defendant had returned home from out of state to find the furnace of 
the trailer he shared with his estranged wife to be out. He attempted to light the furnace 
and testified that there was an "unexpected burst of fire" and he accidentally dropped 
lighted paper in the hallway in front of the furnace in his haste to get to the bathroom to 
soak his burned hand. In addition, he initially told a different story. A fire investigator 
concluded that the fire could not have started that way because there was no evidence of 
an explosion in the furnace. Moreover, the furnace had been serviced regularly including 
that year, the valve was in the "on" position at the time of the fire and not in the "pilot" 
position as suggested by defendant, and when the estranged wife left the trailer the 
control valve was similarly in the "on" position and the furnace was operating normally. 
Scheel, 823 P.2d at 471, n. 4. Thus there was direct evidence in this case that the 
defendant was lying about the cause of the fire. 
In State v. Clark, 675 P.2d 557 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendants' conviction for 
aggravated arson. The relevant facts are that at approximately one o'clock in the 
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morning, fire was observed "springing up directly from a concrete floor and empty 
Coleman fuel cans, which suggested that fire accelerant had been used." In addition, two 
experts testified that the fire was likely started by the fiimace pilot light igniting a 
flammable petroleum product that had been poured on the side of the furnace and spread 
on the floor with a broom. A Mountain Fuel Company investigator also ruled out furnace 
malfunction or the water heater as possible sources of the fire, and a license electrical 
contractor showed that faulty electrical wiring did not cause the fire. 675 P.2d at 558, 
559. Moreover, the defendants gave conflicting testimony regarding the events prior to 
the fire. Both defendants were present in the home when the fire occurred and were 
burned. Clark, 675 P.2d at 559. Thus the evidence in Clark did not support a reasonable 
hypothesis that the fire was started accidentally or that someone other than the defendants 
started it. 
In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991), a fire was discovered between 3:15-
3:20 a.m. in the apartment of Barbara Lee. The Salt Lake Fire Department arrived within 
five minutes and the fire was quickly extinguished. The investigator estimated the fire 
had burned for 15-20 minutes prior to arrival by the fire department and that the fire had 
been intentionally set because of the intensity of the fire, the burn pattern, and the 
presence of a pungent odor hours after the fire which signaled the use of an accelerant. 
Approximately 10 days before the fire, Lee had broken up with the defendant, Span, who 
was also the father of her daughter. During the period between the breakup and the fire, 
Span broke her car windshield twice, placed her belongings on the porch of their 
common residence in the snow, and had forcibly entered her father's house while she was 
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present. On the night of the fire, Span confronted Lee and another male at the bar where 
she worked and allegedly vandalized both of their vehicles. Afterwards he decided to 
leave town but sometime between 3:45-4:15 he stopped at the house of a friend. The 
friend testified that Span told her he was leaving for Las Vegas, that he was upset 
because Lee had left the bar earlier with the other man, and that he told her either, 
"'Barbara's apartment is in flames/ or 'I flamed Barbara's apartment'" At trial Span 
explained his statement to the friend to mean that he had driven by Lee's apartment and 
had seen the fire trucks. 819 P.2d at 330-31. Therefore, not only was there direct 
evidence against Span but the combination of direct and circumstantial evidence did not 
support a reasonable hypothesis of Span's innocence. 
In State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 1986), the defendants were in California 
when a fire erupted in their Utah home. The house was on the real estate market but the 
real estate broker testified that she had not shown the home and did not have any 
potential buyers; and that the defendants had refused to give her a key. The amount of 
insurance on the house had recently been increased. In addition, several months earlier 
Mr. Nickles had asked the Murray City Fire Department questions about arson and 
liquids that could be used to set fires. At the time of the fire, certain valuables had been 
removed from the house along with birth certificates and personal papers. Investigators 
found evidence of a flammable liquid explosion and found in the daughter's bedroom 
what appeared to be a timing device with trailers leading into the hallway. In addition, 
acetone soaked suitcases were located under the stairway in the basement. The explosion 
was not consistent with a natural gas explosion. 728 P.2d at 125-26. Similar to Span 
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discussed above, there was both direct and circumstantial evidence against Nr. Nickles 
and no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
In this case, the evidence against Landry is circumstantial in nature and does not 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. Landry has marshaled the 
evidence in the statement of facts* However, he will do so again here to demonstrate that 
the State's evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that he intentionally by means 
of fire or explosives damaged his apartment and the apartment complex. 
This case is similar to Nickles and Span in that Landry was not present at the scene 
of the fire when it was discovered, unlike the defendants in Clark, Scheel, and Durant. 
The Mendel's testified to seeing Landry leave approximately five to ten minutes before 
they learned of the fire in his apartment (R. 118: 86, 90, 96). Matthew Mendel thought 
he was with a Caucasian male while Brittany could not tell if the person Landry was with 
was male or female (R. 118: 86, 97). Landry admitted to being at the apartment shortly 
before the fire with "Josephine," a girl friend, and that the two of them watched 
television, talked, had sex and that Josephine smoked a cigarette at the end of the bed (R. 
119: 16). In addition, another witness, David Turpin, testified to seeing a black man 
wearing dark clothes and a dark hat at Landry's door shortly before the fire as he was 
leaving his apartment which was next to Landry's (R. 119: 7). He did not see Landry that 
afternoon (R. 119: 8). Jim Guynn, one of the fire marshals, verified that Turpin had told 
authorities about seeing a man at Landry's door along with a particular car (R. 119: 30-
31). However, no further information was found regarding that individual. 
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Accordingly, Landry was not present at the time of the fire. He was at the 
apartment shortly before but so apparently was another unidentified man who was 
wearing dark clothes, a dark hat and glasses. Moreover, the door to Landry's apartment 
was unlocked (R. 119:21) and several witnesses indicated that a window was broken and 
covered with cardboard (R. 119: 6, 21, 118:116). 
In this case, experts concluded that the fire was intentionally set (R. 118: 143, 
173). These conclusions were reached because nothing was discovered which would 
have suggested an accidental cause and because the burn patterns on the floor were 
indicative of a poured or flowing liquid on the floor that had been ignited thereby causing 
increased damage in those particular areas on the floor (R. 118: 140-43, 165-67). The 
charred wood and the particle board that was sent to the crime lab tested positive for the 
substance heptane, which is a substance that is present in a variety of ignitable liquids 
primarily petroleum based (R. 118: 153). However, heptane can also be found in inert 
glues and substances used in the construction process (R. 118: 153). A fire dog 
purportedly alerted on one of Landry's socks and shoe during contact with him at a motel 
(R. 118: 105-06). However, not only is there nothing in the record to suggest that 
heptane was found in the shoe or sock, there is not even a crime lab report identifying any 
flammable substance on those items. Moreover, it is undisputed that Landry returned to 
the apartment after the fire because he saw the it on television and was concerned about 
obtaining his medication and other belongings (R. 119: 19). And while the State's 
witnesses testified that an ignitable fluid was probably poured where the fire originated, 
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there is no evidence of any container being left at or near the scene or of Landry leaving 
with such a container when he left the apartment shortly before the fire started. 
The real question in this case is whether Landry's occupation of the apartment 
where the fire originated, his presence at the apartment shortly before the fire, and the 
mere fact that the fire dog alerted on his sock and shoe is sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was the individual who intentionally set fire to the apartment. 
While it is true that Landry was being evicted from the apartment, and while it is 
true that the bum patterns and intensity of the fire appear similar, there is no evidence to 
suggest that there were any bad feelings about the eviction between him and the 
apartment management unlike the defendant in Span, who had vandalized the property of 
his ex-girlfriend on at least three occasions, broken into her father's house while she was 
present, and had told a third party either that the apartment was "in flames" or that he had 
"flamed" her apartment. 
Landry made no such statements here but repeatedly denied starting the fire. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Landry was angry or vindictive or upset about the 
eviction. Certainly, the requisite intent for aggravated arson cannot be inferred from the 
mere circumstantial fact that Landry was being evicted. Moreover, an independent 
witness testified that an unnamed third person was likewise in the proximity of Landry's 
apartment close in time to the fire. 
In addition, unlike the fire in Nickles, there was no evidence of containers or items 
that had contained or been soaked in ignitable liquid nor was there any evidence of an 
ignition source for the fire whereas in Nickles there were suitcases soaked in acetone and 
23 
a timing device. In this case, surfaces on the floor—carpet, particle board and even 
deeper surfaces tested positive for heptane, an ingredient in a variety of ignitable liquids, 
including inert glues and other construction materials. However, how that ignitable 
liquid got on the floor—whether it was poured or spilled—is unknown (R. 118: 148, 
188). No containers of such flammable liquid were found anywhere near the scene nor 
was Landry seen carrying any such container when he was observed leaving his 
apartment five to ten minutes before the fire started. 
The circumstantial evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that such an 
ignitable liquid was intentionally poured rather than spilled or that fire was intentionally 
set to that liquid. Moreover, the evidence is also insufficient to establish either his intent 
or his identity as the perpetrator of the crime of aggravated arson. He asserts that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt as to his culpability. Further, 
there are reasonable hypotheses of Landry's innocence, including the possibility that 
someone else started the fire then left the back way testified to by the Mendels. Such an 
individual carrying the container of ignitable liquid without being seen. Moreover, it 
would seem that if Landry had indeed started the fire, he would have left the back way to 
avoid being seen. Instead, he walked past the Mendel's apartment in full view then 
returned to the scene as soon as he learned about the fire. Thus the circumstantial 
evidence against Landry is extraordinarily weak and does not preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of his innocence. 
This evidence is so insufficient that the jurors must have entertained some 
reasonable doubt as evidenced by two notes from the jury indicating they were at an 
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impasse after five hours of deliberations. It was only when faced with the real prospect 
of being required to return the following day that the jury was able to reach a unanimous 
verdict. 
The jury clearly struggled with the weak circumstantial evidence in this case. 
Landry's trial was scheduled to last for only two days* However, on the second day and 
after lengthy deliberation, the jury was deadlocked and unable to reach a unanimous 
verdict. The court was preparing to send the jury home for the evening with instructions 
to return on the unplanned for third day when the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Now, I know you have problems, each and every one of 
you. We scheduled two days. I know some of you have got some real difficult 
commitments, but these things happen like I said, when we started the trial. I can't 
predict how long the deliberations are, how long the arguments go on, how long 
the case goes on. We thought two days would be adequate for the case, and based 
on what's gone on it hadn't - hasn't worked out that way. 
So question, No. 1. 
A JUROR: I would just say there is one among our number that is going to 
suffer, not terrible, but not great duress, but I was wondering if we were all in 
agreement for us to continue rather than go home in respect for that individual. 
THE COURT: I'm just thinking of you, what's best for all of you. That 
depends on all of you collectively. And I'm not trying to force any decision or 
coerce you in any way to deliberate tonight. I don't want to get into that. I want it 
to be clear I want you to be fresh and have an opportunity to go home and rest. 
A JUROR: Could we go discuss that? 
THE COURT: If you'd like to discuss that I would surely respect your 
views as a group. If you'd like to do that outside of all of our presence, go back 
and talk about that for a minute. 
A JUROR: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Nothing should be interpreted as trying to force you to 
reach a decision tonight. 
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A JUROR: This is out of courtesy. We've gotten to respect each other 
quite a bit. 
Rl 19:57-8. 
Thus the jury opted to continue trying to teach a unanimous verdict rather than 
return for a third day. The record indicates that at least one juror was going to suffer 
some undisclosed hardship and the remaining jurors felt an obligation to accommodate 
that juror. Rl 19:57. Therefore, the jury opted to continue deliberating, i.e. trying to 
reach a unanimous verdict after being unable to do so, rather than have to return the next 
day. Rl 19: 59. Only when the jury was faced with the prospect of having to return for a 
third day did the jury reach a unanimous verdict of guilty. 
In summary, the evidence presented against Landry in this case was circumstantial 
and not sufficient to preclude every reasonable hypothesis of Landry's innocence. 
Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient and necessarily raised a reasonable doubt that 
Landry committed the crime with which he was charged. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Landry asks that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this matter to the 
Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of April, 2008. 
Jennifer K. Gowafas 
Counsel for Appellant 
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